T he first step in transforming strategy from a hopeful statement about the future into an operational reality is to allocate resources to innovation and new product development (NPD) programs in a portfolio. Resource allocation and NPD portfolio decisions often span multiple levels of the organization's hierarchy, leading to questions about how much authority to bestow on managers and how to structure incentives for NPD. In this study, we explore how funding authority and incentives affect a manager's allocation of resources between existing product improvement (relatively incremental projects) and new product development (more radical projects). Funding may be either fixed or variable depending on the extent to which the manager has the authority to use revenue derived from existing product sales to fund NPD efforts. We find that the use of variable funding drives higher effort toward improving existing products and developing new products. However, variable funding has a subtle side effect: it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development, and the relative balance in the NPD portfolio shifts toward incremental innovation. In addition, we highlight a substitution effect between explicit incentives (compensation parameters) and implicit incentives (career concerns). Explicit incentives are reduced as career concerns become more salient.
Introduction
The question of which innovation programs to pursue is critical to a firm's success and is often cited as a key competitive dimension (Roussel et al. 1991 , Wheelwright and Clark 1992 , Cooper et al. 1998 . Indeed, the first step in transforming strategy from a hopeful statement about the future into an operational reality is to allocate resources to innovation and new product development (NPD) programs in a portfolio. Determining an appropriate level of funding for innovation programs is difficult, particularly when programs conflict in terms of rewards, risks, and resource requirements. Success then requires a difficult balancing act: short-term benefits accrued through incremental improvements to existing products versus long-term benefits achieved through radical, new-to-the-market, or new-to-the-world products and services (Tushman and O'Reilly 1996) .
Further complicating matters is the fact that strategy formulation and resource allocation typically occur in a top-down manner within the firm (Loch and Tapper 2002 , Anderson and Joglekar 2005 . Strategies outlined by senior executives define the operating environment for subordinate levels of decision making. Consider the following example, typical of any large corporation: Senior executives set broad goals regarding corporate strategy (e.g., five years from today, 50% of revenue will come from new products; over the next year, costs must be reduced by 5%). Managers are responsible for transforming that strategy into a reality. To do so, they make decisions with respect to broad programs within the portfolio (e.g., halt next-generation technological development and embark on manufacturing process improvements).
A rich history of scholarship considers the resource allocation problem and the incentive issues created by organizational hierarchies. Practice has evolved, however, to incorporate various rules not often considered by these research streams.
1 These rules often 1 We use the term "rule" to mean an explicit or understood regulation or principle that governs conduct within the firm. The concept is related to that of a routine, practice, protocol, convention, mechanism, or norm, depending on the academic heritage of the reader.
determine which level in the organization's hierarchy has the authority to make decisions (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Baker et al. 1999) . One particular rule that has a profound effect on NPD processes is that which determines funding authority for innovation initiatives. We say that NPD funding is fixed when a manager does not have authority over the manner in which the budget is created. Alternatively, we say that NPD funding is variable when the manager has the authority to use revenue derived from existing product sales to fund NPD effort. In practice, managers often claim they need authority over NPD funding (a variable budget) to effectively manage resources. Despite this claim, firms seem to follow various policies with respect to funding authority, incentives, and resource allocation strategy (Christensen and Anthony 2005) . The hierarchical structure of decision making regarding resource allocation and NPD portfolio management, the prevalence of authority and incentive issues, and the fact that practice varies so widely with respect to these matters prompt us to ask the following question: How does funding authority impact incentives, resource allocation, and NPD portfolio strategy? In addition to funding authority, we also consider typical agency issues that result from the organization hierarchy. Senior management (the principal) determines incentives in the presence of noisy information regarding the resource allocation decisions of a manager (the agent). The agent is responsible for resource allocation decisions, and she is held accountable for those decisions. We borrow from a seminal model in the economics literature to account for the multiple innovation opportunities available to the agent (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) , and we characterize accountability through the agent's career concerns (Zwiebel 1995 , Holmstrom 1999 , Siemsen 2008 .
Our results indicate that funding authority has significant implications for both the structure of incentives and the allocation of resources. When managers have funding authority, their incentives for innovation are greater and they invest more in both existing product improvement (incremental effort) and new product development (innovative effort). However, variable funding may have an unintended side effect-it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than on new product development, and the relative balance in the NPD portfolio shifts toward incremental innovation. This effect is so robust that it takes place even when the manager's actions are perfectly observable. When actions are not perfectly observable, we uncover a form of substitution between wage incentives (explicit incentives) and the manager's career concerns (implicit incentives). Traditional wage incentives are reduced as the manager's career concerns become more significant. The lower wage incentives result in lower effort and, subsequently, lower joint surplus.
Related Literature
There is extensive literature on organization theory that focuses on the link between structure and performance (Galbraith 1977 , Mintzberg 1980 , Ouchi 1979 , Eisenhardt 1985 , Tushman and O'Reilly 1996 . Much of this work is aimed at understanding the physical structure of work teams or business units (e.g., matrix, functional, or decentralized structures). Although structure is an important determinant of success, organization theorists note that authority and control are also important elements of organization design (Ouchi 1979 , Eisenhardt 1985 . Two decades of scholarly work take note of this observation (Lewin and Minton 1986 , Barley and Kunda 1992 , Kumar and Seth 1998 , Bate et al. 2000 . Important themes common to this body of research are the implicit and explicit incentives that drive action.
Incentive mechanisms have long been within the purview of researchers in economics. Grossman and Hart (1983) formalize the nature of compensation and explicit incentives, whereas Holmstrom (1999) formalizes the concept of career concerns as implicit incentives. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) consider the interplay between compensation (explicit incentives) and career concerns (implicit incentives) when the agent makes a single resource allocation decision. Kaarboe and Olsen (2006) extend the work of Gibbons and Murphy to a multitask setting. Aghion and Tirole (1997) discuss the tension between formal and real authority in organizations, and Baker et al. (1999) show that informal authority is beneficial in settings characterized by repeated interactions. We build upon this work in that we consider resource allocation between multiple innovation initiatives in the presence of implicit and explicit incentives, and we add the practical element of funding authority.
Researchers have studied the impact of incentives on NPD processes. Lambert (1986) models an agency problem in which the manager must be induced to select either a safe or a risky project. Our work considers the simultaneous balance between safe and risky efforts. Holmstrom (1989) considers a portfolio of efforts and shows that incentive costs associated with an individual task depend on the portfolio of tasks that a firm undertakes. Pollack and Zeckhauser (1996) study a situation in which a central agency must allocate a (fixed) budget between various business units. We extend this theory to situations in which the manager may have funding authority. Siemsen (2008) studies the design decisions made by engineers in the presence of career concerns. He finds that noisy signals with respect to capabilities may lead to overdesign. We also consider a form of career concerns, and our link to fiscal responsibility is explicit.
A related stream of research exists in the area of corporate finance. This research considers the capital budgeting (resource allocation) problem in conjunction with issues related to incentives. Early work in this area focused on understanding the drivers of organizational slack (overfunding) and resource rationing (underfunding) for investment opportunities. Studies by Antle and Eppen (1985) , Harris and Raviv (1996) , and Bernardo et al. (2001) fall under this category. They model a single investment opportunity in a single-period setting. More recently, Dutta (2003) looks at the issue of managerial retention when the manager has private information about a (single) investment opportunity and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture. Most closely related to our work is that of Stein (2002) . He studies which type of organization form (decentralized versus hierarchy) is preferred depending on the portfolio of investments available to the firm. From a conceptual viewpoint, we differ from previous research in that we consider the dynamic allocation of resources between multiple projects in the NPD portfolio. Furthermore, we explicitly introduce the notion of fixed versus variable NPD funding and career concerns, which, to our knowledge, have not been addressed in prior work.
Our efforts enrich the literature along two important dimensions. First, we explicitly account for the realistic notion that NPD funding is not always fixed; rather, it may be determined by the authority given to a manager and his ability to generate revenue. Second, we analyze both explicit and implicit incentive mechanisms within the context of innovation. Because we include funding authority, incentives, and resource allocation decisions in one model, we are able to uncover the interaction between important processes that impact firm performance.
A Model of Incentives and Resource Allocation
Our model is best suited to a divisionalized firm in which a senior manager or CEO oversees multiple operating units, divisions, or groups, each of which has profit and loss responsibility. We focus our attention on the interaction between the CEO (the principal) and the senior decision maker (the agent) within one of the business units. Consider then a principal-agent relationship in which the agent makes a choice regarding resource allocation between incremental and radical NPD programs over a portfolio review cycle t ∈ 0 T . The length of the portfolio review cycle may be as short as a fiscal quarter, or it may be as long as a fiscal year. The business unit produces and sells an existing product and attempts to develop a new product throughout the portfolio review cycle.
Improving the Existing Product and
Developing the New Product The agent invests in incremental improvements to the existing product to sustain or enhance its revenue potential. These include minor technological upgrades (e.g., larger storage capacity in a laptop computer), small modifications of market attributes (e.g., changes to product packaging), or process improvements leading to lower manufacturing and distribution costs. Let p 1 t ≥ 0 be the rate of investment in incremental improvements to the existing product at time t. The cumulative investment in the existing product through time t is defined as P 1 t = P 1 0 + t 0 p 1 s ds. Because the business unit is producing and selling the existing product at t = 0, there is a known initial cumulative investment P 1 0 > 0.
In addition to improving the existing product, the agent allocates resources to develop a new product, which is fundamentally different from the existing in terms of underlying technology and market attributes. Let p 2 t ≥ 0 be the rate of investment in developing the new product at time t. This includes time and equipment invested in concept generation, design, and testing activities to ensure manufacturing and market viability (Ulrich and Eppinger 2004) . The cumulative investment in the new product through time t is P 2 t = t 0 p 2 s ds. The principal cannot directly observe the agent's resource allocation decisions; instead, he sees information signals, x i t = p i t + i , where i ∼ N 0 2 i for i = 1 2. Thus, the agent's resource allocation decisions are observable, if imperfectly so. The agent's choice of p 1 and p 2 is noisy for a number of reasons. First, given the agent's role as a manager, it is reasonable to assume that she has specific knowledge regarding the details of how resources contribute to the execution of projects. Second, despite the best accounting and data collection systems, there is strong evidence that some important information, such as the precise time allocation of human resources and equipment, is often hidden in the divisions and business units of multidivisional firms. The economics literature describes this phenomenon as "cheap talk" (Farrell and Rabin 1996) and has shown that information transmission between the principal and the agent may be imperfect because the latter is not communicating all relevant information. Note that x 1 and x 2 inform the principal about the total investment over the portfolio review cycle and provide the inputs necessary for the principal to design incentives for existing and new product effort.
Cost of New Product Development
The agent's resource allocation decisions translate into costs, C 1 p 1 and C 2 p 2 , which are incurred by the principal because p 1 and p 2 are organizational resources invested in innovation activities (e.g., personnel and/or equipment dedicated to a task). The cost functions are independent, which corresponds to organizational resources that are dedicated to one or the other NPD program, but not both. We assume that C i 0 = 0 and C i is increasing and convex, reflecting diseconomies of scale with respect to investment at any instant of time (e.g., coordination costs or capacity constraints with respect to specialized resources). The assumption that costs are convex is realistic over a considerable range of situations because innovative activity is, for the most part, an act of creativity and discovery, and our focus is on a single portfolio review cycle.
Existing Product Revenue and
New Product Payoff The agent's investments generate two revenue streams, which accrue to the principal. The revenue (net of manufacturing and distribution costs) generated at time t from the existing product is given by R 1 P 1 .
2 Higher cumulative investment in the existing product results in increased revenue with diminishing returns, so that R 1 / P 1 ≥ 0 and 2 R 1 / P 2 1 ≤ 0. We also recognize that the existing product may generate value after the portfolio review cycle. Let V 1 P 1 be the revenue generated by the existing product beyond T with V 1 / P 1 ≥ 0, 2 V 1 / P 2 1 ≤ 0. Commercialization of the new product is affected by technical and market uncertainty. Still, the agent can invest resources to improve the probability of successful development. Let F t be the (cumulative) probability that the new product is successfully developed before time t. The agent affects the conditional probability of successful development at t (given that development has not occurred prior to t). We let F t / 1 − F t = h p 2 , where h is increasing and concave. Upon successful development, the new product generates a revenue stream R 2 P 2 , with R 2 / P 2 ≥ 0 and 2 R 2 / P 2 2 ≤ 0. Furthermore, we recognize that the effort invested in the new product may generate value after the portfolio review cycle. Let V 2 P 2 be the expected revenue generated by the new product beyond T , with V 2 / P 2 ≥ 0 and 2 V 2 / P 2 2 ≤ 0.
2 Our formulation assumes that effort immediately impacts revenue. In the appendix, we provide an extension that considers a time lag between effort and revenue, and we show that our fundamental insights remain the same.
Funding Authority
A novel aspect of our model is the explicit consideration of how funding authority affects resource allocation and NPD portfolio strategy. We focus our attention on funding because it is explicitly linked to resources-the money that is critical for NPD activity.
Other common rules, routines, or mechanisms used in practice (such as matrix structures, heavyweight project management, skunk-works, or focused teams, among others) dictate the "physical" structure of the organization and implicitly determine where the money comes from and who in the organization has the authority to make decisions (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Baker et al. 1999) . Through the use of funding authority and the principal-agent relationship, we make explicit the source of money and the decisions facing each party. We consider authority in the form of fixed or variable funding, ∈ B R 1 . Note that explicitly determines who has authority with respect to funding and how the funds are made available during the portfolio review cycle. Resource allocation and NPD portfolio scholars typically assume that managers do not have authority over funding. In such cases, we define fixed funding as = B, and we say that the manager lacks authority over NPD funding. We also consider situations in which the revenue earned from existing product sales funds product improvement and development efforts. We define variable funding as = R 1 , where is the percentage of existing product revenue that is made available for improving the existing product and developing the new product. When the manager operates under variable funding, she has the authority to alter funding dynamically depending on the revenue generated by the existing product. Our model of variable funding is conceptually aligned with Hartmann et al. (2006) , who argue that organizations should align budgets with the revenue resulting from the R&D investment.
NPD funding and the allocated resources p 1 and p 2 together determine the cumulative net budget at the end of the portfolio review cycle,
Note that Z T may be positive or negative: We allow for instances when funding may be insufficient for the required improvement and development efforts, in which case Z T will be negative (a common scenario in practice). Alternatively, funding may exceed what is needed for existing product improvement and new product development, and the result is a net budget surplus.
Career Concerns
The agent has responsibility for resource allocation decisions, and she is held accountable for those decisions. We consider the cumulative net budget as a proxy for the agent's ability to effectively manage Principal chooses funding authority ( ). resources over the portfolio review cycle. Negative values of Z T imply a budget overrun, which is commonly associated with mismanagement of resources.
A positive value of Z T implies a budget surplus, which is often associated with skillful resource management. To formalize this concept, we define the function C 3 Z T as the cost (benefit) to the agent when the cumulative net budget is negative (positive) at time T , and we assume that C 3 0 = 0, C 3 / Z ≥ 0, and 2 C 3 / Z 2 ≤ 0. We interpret C 3 Z T as the agent's career concerns (Zwiebel 1995 , Holmstrom 1999 , Siemsen 2008 .
3 If the cumulative net budget is negative (a budget overrun), then C 3 Z T is negative and the agent is adversely affected in the form of demotion or limited external opportunities. Conversely, if the cumulative net budget is positive (a budget surplus), then C 3 Z T is positive, and the agent is positively affected in the form of a career advancement or better external opportunities.
Based on the above, our principal-agent model can be described in two stages ( Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events). In stage 1 the principal decides whether or not to grant funding authority to the agent ( ). Note that once is chosen, it is not easily changed. In fact, may not even be an explicit choice-it may be the result of deep-rooted organization routines that are difficult to change (Nelson and Winter 1982) . It is reasonable to assume that is defined before the principal offers the agent a contract and the agent allocates resources. In stage 2, the principal offers the agent a contract:
x 2 ds. The contract specifies a linear wage consisting of a fixed portion plus incentives that depend on the agent's efforts over the portfolio review cycle.
1 and 2 represent any performance metric of interest to the principal. Our model is robust to this formulation because we can always redefine the agent's choice variables so that 1 p 1 = p 1 and 2 p 2 = p 2 (see Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, p. 31 , for more details). 4 3.6. The Objective The principal's objective is to maximize his expected net payoff:
revenue generated minus cost of allocated resources minus wage paid to the agent), subject to the agent's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. The agent allocates resources such that she maximizes her expected payoff: U w + C 3 Z T (utility over wage earned and career concerns), where U x = − exp −rx and r is the agent's coefficient of risk aversion.
An incentive-efficient linear contract must maximize the total certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their joint surplus) subject to all constraints (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) . We formalize this concept in Proposition 1. To facilitate exposition, all technical details and proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) . For a given funding authority ( ), the principal's secondstage problem can be stated as
(1) subject to the agent's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints and the dynamic equations that define P 1 , P 2 , F , and Z.
Proposition 1 is a result that follows as a solution to the principal-agent problem in optimality. The principal maximizes the joint surplus, and the fixed portion of the wage is simply a transfer payment that determines how the joint surplus is split between the principal and the agent. In Equation (1), the term within the integrand is the net benefit from resource allocation over the review cycle (total expected revenue earned from the existing product and the new product minus the total cost of resources for improving the existing product and developing the new product). V 1 and V 2 represent the value of the existing product and the new product after the portfolio review cycle. C 3 Z T captures the agent's career concerns regarding the cumulative net budget. The final term represents lost surplus because the principal must induce a risk-averse agent to allocate resources, and the principal lacks reliable information regarding the agent's resource allocation decisions.
Analytic Results: First-Best Outcome
We now turn our attention toward insights obtained from the first-best outcome (we analyze the secondbest outcome and the choice of incentives in §5). Delegation of the resource allocation decision creates an agency problem when (i) the agent is risk averse or (ii) information about the agent's actions is imperfect. Thus, the first-best outcome occurs when r = 0 or 2 1 = 2 2 = 0 in (1). This represents the ideal scenario in which the principal has complete information regarding the agent's resource allocation decisions and these decisions are contractible. In that case, the problem facing the principal becomes
subject to the dynamic equations that define P 1 , P 2 , F , and Z. Note that for the first-best outcome, the principal optimizes over p 1 and p 2 and implements a wage contract such that the agent does not deviate from the principal's choice of p 1 and p 2 . In the appendix, we provide detailed analysis of the necessary conditions for the optimal resource allocation.
Funding Authority and NPD Portfolio Balance
We now consider how funding authority impacts the balance between existing product improvement and new product development. We formalize the concept of balance through a ratio of resource expenditure: C 2 / C 1 + C 2 . A lower value of C 2 / C 1 + C 2 indicates that the balance shifts toward improving the existing product. In that light, a lower value of C 2 / C 1 + C 2 is an incremental NPD portfolio strategy compared with a higher value of C 2 / C 1 + C 2 . NPD portfolio balance is an important innovation metric used by practitioners because it serves as a proxy for the organization's innovation focus (Roussel et al. 1991 , Wheelwright and Clark 1992 , Cooper et al. 1998 . In Proposition 2, we show how NPD funding rules affect the NPD portfolio balance.
Proposition 2 (Funding Authority and NPD Portfolio Balance). Proposition 2 states that variable funding causes the NPD portfolio balance to shift toward existing product investment and a more incremental strategy compared with fixed funding. Variable funding drives an incremental strategy because existing product revenue is used to fund both types of investments. Thus, there is an additional driver in place that prompts the agent to pursue higher p 1 in order to increase the funds available for both types of effort. Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of funding rules and balance in the NPD portfolio.
Note that a shift in the NPD portfolio balance toward incremental investment does not imply less investment in developing the new product. In fact, under variable funding, p 2 may increase, albeit not as much as p 1 . The reasoning is as follows: Under variable funding p 1 is higher throughout the portfolio review cycle, leading to a higher value of Z T . The higher value of Z T results in a lower marginal cost associated with career concerns and subsequently increases p 1 and p 2 . Thus, the use of variable funding increases p 1 and p 2 , although the degree of increase in p 1 is considerably higher and the balance in the NPD portfolio shifts toward incremental NPD programs. Our analysis uncovers an interesting paradox-variable funding drives higher overall investment. At the same time, variable funding drives a shift in NPD portfolio balance toward incremental efforts. Thus, the use of variable funding allows the firm to become more innovative in absolute terms (higher resource expenditure) by being more incremental in relative terms (NPD portfolio balance).
In practice, many firms establish fixed budgets for existing product improvement and new product development. Fixed budgets are often susceptible to gaming and can lead to a clash of incentives between senior executives and the managers responsible for resource allocation. 5 One might think that senior executives can introduce accountability and alignment between the manager and overall corporate goals by granting managers funding authority. Our results show that such a policy would indeed result in more effort toward improving existing products and developing new products. This policy may have an unintended consequence, however; under variable funding, the agent has an incentive to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development. In the long run, this leads to an incremental balance in the NPD portfolio. Given this result, it is not surprising that many organizations earmark resources for radical innovation initiatives .
Career Concerns and NPD Portfolio Balance
We now turn our attention to the impact of the agent's career concerns on resource allocation and NPD portfolio balance. The results are presented in Proposition 3. The term C 3 / Z determines the significance of the agent's career concerns. If the organization employs fixed funding, a higher value of C 3 / Z always results in lower effort expended on existing product improvement because p 1 is inversely related to C 3 / Z (i.e., there is a trade-off between investing effort to generate revenue and saving resources in the cumulative net budget). Conversely, if the organization employs variable funding, there exists an interval of time early in the development cycle when a higher value of C 3 / Z calls for higher investment in existing product improvement. This result is because variable funding allows the agent to generate additional resources through incremental improvements to the existing product. The additional resources have value because they can be deployed in response to an increased penalty for being over budget. Of course, increased investment in improving the existing product makes sense only if there is enough time remaining in the portfolio review cycle to reap the rewards; thus there exists a threshold time when the agent is operating under variable funding.
In the case of p 2 , a higher value of C 3 / Z results in lower investment in developing the new product whether funding is fixed or variable. This insight coupled with the result for p 1 leads to the conclusion that a higher value of C 3 / Z drives a shift toward incremental NPD programs early in the portfolio review cycle if the agent is operating under variable funding. To understand this result, note that an agent operating under variable funding has two levers that can offset the higher value of C 3 / Z. The agent can increase resource expenditure for the existing product in order to generate more revenue and increase the cumulative net budget, or she can lower resource expenditure in order to save costs and increase the cumulative net budget. If there is sufficient time remaining in the development cycle, the former strategy is advocated (so long as the agent is operating under variable funding). The result is a shift toward incremental effort in the NPD portfolio because p 1 is higher and p 2 is lower.
In general, p 1 and p 2 may act as substitutes or complements depending on the funding authority. The interaction takes the form of a trade-off between p 1 and p 2 based on the marginal value of the cumulative net budget. When the manager operates under fixed funding, any effect that drives lower p 1 will subsequently lead to lower C 1 and higher Z T . Because 2 C 3 / Z 2 ≤ 0, a higher value of Z T will lead to lower C 3 / Z. And because p 2 is inversely related to C 3 / Z, lower C 3 / Z implies higher p 2 . Thus, under fixed funding, any parameter that directly impacts p 1 has the opposite effect on p 2 because of their interaction through Z T . On the other hand, p 1 and p 2 act as complements when the manager operates under variable funding. In these cases higher p 1 leads to higher Z T and lower C 3 / Z. Again, because p 2 is inversely related to C 3 / Z, lower C 3 / Z implies higher p 2 . When the agent is operating under variable funding, any model parameter that directly impacts p 1 will have the same effect on p 2 .
Extensions to the First-Best Outcome
In this section, we discuss two extensions to the firstbest outcome. The first is concerned with the timing of career concerns for the agent. Our formulation assumes that the agent's career concerns, C 3 Z T , are accounted for only at the end of the portfolio review cycle. It is possible that the career concerns are accounted for throughout the portfolio review period (for a detailed analysis of this formulation, please see Chao 2007) . In this case, the path of Z t during the portfolio review cycle (in addition to its value at the end of the portfolio review cycle) impacts the cost/benefit associated with the agent's career concerns, and we have C 3 Z t . Chao (2007) shows that our insights regarding funding authority and balance in the NPD portfolio remain qualitatively the same. Still, timing career concerns throughout the portfolio review cycle increases the marginal value of the cumulative net budget and subsequently lowers the values of p 1 and p 2 .
The second extension is concerned with the independent costs (C 1 and C 2 ) and values (V 1 and V 2 ).
It is possible that the same resource may contribute to both NPD programs simultaneously, in which case the two efforts interact through a combined cost function, C p 1 p 2 . Likewise, value dependency between the two products is possible. For example, brand awareness generated by the existing product may increase the value of the new product, in which case the two efforts interact through a general value function, V P 1 P 2 . In each of these extensions, one would expect to see a second-order interaction between p 1 and p 2 in addition to the first-order interaction, which is due to funding authority. That is to say, higher effort toward improving the existing product would lead to a higher marginal cost for developing the new product and subsequently lower investment in developing the new product (and vice versa). On the value side, brand awareness due to the existing product would lead to higher marginal value for the new product and subsequently higher investment in developing the new product (and vice versa).
Choice of Funding Authority and Incentives
The second-best outcome is achieved by ensuring that the agent's incentive compatibility constraint is binding for the values of a 1 and a 2 that maximize the joint surplus in (1). Proposition 4 provides necessary conditions for the optimal choice of a 1 and a 2 .
Proposition 4 (Optimal Choice of Incentives). The optimal incentives for existing product investment, a * 1 , and new product investment, a * 2 , are implicitly defined by the following equations:
These necessary conditions have economic intuition; they equate marginal benefit with marginal cost. In the case of a * 1 , the marginal benefit consists of the existing product revenue throughout the portfolio review period, plus the value of this effort after the portfolio review period, plus a term that increases the cumulative net budget, if the agent is operating under variable funding (note that this term is set to zero if the agent is operating under fixed funding). In the case of a * 2 , the marginal benefit consists of the expected revenue from the new product during the portfolio review period plus the value of this effort Table 1 Joint Surplus and NPD Portfolio Balance
Fixed funding Variable funding
First-best Joint surplus = 203 8 Joint surplus = 231 3 outcome P 1 T = 41 6 P 2 T = 32 3
Second-best Joint surplus = 182 9 Joint surplus = 209 7 outcome P 1 T = 43 2 P 2 T = 30 7 P 1 T = 53 0 P 2 T = 32 3 C 2 / C 1 + C 2 = 0 681
after the portfolio review period. For both a * 1 and a * 2 , the marginal costs consist of the cost of effort throughout the portfolio review period, plus the effect of this cost on the cumulative net budget, plus the agent's risk premium.
The lack of a closed-form structure in the necessary conditions for a * 1 and a * 2 precludes meaningful comparative statics analysis. Instead, we develop insights regarding the incentives and the joint surplus, through a numerical analysis (a detailed account of all functional forms, base case parameter values, experiments, and results for the numerical analysis is available upon request). In what follows, we present and discuss a subset of the most interesting results. Table 1 depicts the joint surplus and the NPD portfolio balance under fixed and variable funding. As expected, the first-best dominates the second-best in terms of joint surplus. Interestingly, variable funding dominates fixed funding in terms of joint surplus, and the total resource expenditure is higher for both the existing and the new product. However, the proportion of resources expended on the new product is significantly lower if the agent is operating under variable funding.
Joint Surplus and NPD Portfolio Balance
These results call for more profound understanding of the alignment between funding authority (where the money comes from) and resource allocation strategy (where the money is invested). The use of variable funding leads (directly) to more investment in improving existing products and (indirectly) to more investment in developing new products. The higher investment generates higher surplus. However, variable funding has a subtle side effect-it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development. The greater focus on existing product improvement leads to an incremental balance in the NPD portfolio.
Explicit and Implicit Incentives for
Resource Allocation Two distinct incentive mechanisms drive the agent's resource allocation decisions. The first (explicit) mechanism consists of incentive parameters a * 1 and a * 2 . The second (implicit) mechanism consists of the agent's career concerns C 3 Z T . Figure 3 depicts the joint surplus and NPD portfolio balance as functions of C 3 / Z. 6 As discussed above, variable funding dominates fixed funding in terms of joint surplus. Furthermore, the joint surplus is a decreasing function of C 3 / Z. For higher values of C 3 / Z, two effects take place. First, for a given value of Z T < 0, the penalty paid by the agent is higher and the joint surplus is adversely affected. Second, in light of the higher cost of being over budget, the agent reduces resource expenditure and less value is created (stated differently, the agent has implicit incentive to reduce the costs associated with p 1 and p 2 ).
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that C 2 / C 1 + C 2 is lower when the agent is operating under variable funding compared to when the agent is operating under fixed funding. Furthermore, the difference is an increasing function of C 3 / Z. As C 3 / Z increases, the greater is the benefit from existing product effort in terms of generating additional budget. Thus, under variable funding, the proportion of resources invested in the existing product increases at a higher rate relative to fixed funding.
The wage incentives offered to the agent behave in a similar fashion. Figure 4 depicts a * 1 and a * 2 as functions of C 3 / Z. The incentives offered when the agent is operating under variable funding are always higher than the incentives under fixed funding. The reason is that variable funding leads to higher Z T , which in turn improves the agent's career concerns, C 3 Z T . This is certainly a benefit for the agent, but the principal does not share the career concerns benefit. The principal must induce higher effort under variable funding to ensure that revenue increases.
Both a * 1 and a * 2 are decreasing functions of C 3 / Z, revealing a substitution effect between implicit and explicit incentives similar to that in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . The substitution effect in our study, however, does not emerge as a result of the dynamic reward mechanisms (i.e., short-term bonus versus long-term reputation). Instead, it takes place because of the indirect implications of fiscal responsibility on the agent's optimal allocation and the principal's need to align incentives for the second-best outcome. Knowing that the agent has a higher penalty associated with C 3 / Z, the principal will offer the agent incentives that result in less resource expenditure.
Conclusions and Implications of the Research
The most important implication of our research is the combination of funding authority and incentives that can be used to drive innovation and profit. Our first conclusion is with regard to the NPD portfolio and the balance between improving an existing product and developing a new product. Managers are correct to ask for greater authority in terms of NPD funding and resource allocation decisions-the use of variable funding creates greater incentives for effort and drives the manager to invest more in existing product improvement and new product development. The result is higher joint surplus. However, variable funding has a subtle side effect-it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development. The greater focus on existing product improvement leads to an incremental balance in the NPD portfolio and puts the firm at risk of underperforming in the long run. A second conclusion is focused on the interplay between explicit wage incentives and implicit career concerns. These two mechanisms are substitutes in the sense that more significant career concerns by the manager lead to lower incentives for effort. The substitution effect takes place because of the different nature of the incentives (maximize wage via effort versus exhibit fiscal responsibility) rather than the timing of the incentives. As the manager's career concerns become more significant, the penalty paid by the manager for a budget deficit increases. Knowing this, senior executives can align implicit and explicit incentives by inducing less investment. Unfortunately, the lower investment results in less value for the firm. This final observation hints at an alternative strategy available to senior executives-attempt to decouple career concerns from fiscal responsibility. Taken together, our insights lead to a number of testable hypotheses that merit empirical validation: These hypotheses allow us to take a necessary step toward understanding important organizational processes that drive innovation and organic growth. Empirical validation of these claims is an open area for future research. Whether considered from the vantage point of senior executives or managers, alignment between NPD funding authority, incentives, and innovation strategy can ensure that resources are effectively allocated to maximize value.
subject to the agent's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints and the dynamic equations that define P 1 , P 2 , F , and Z.
Proof of Proposition 1. The agent chooses p 1 and p 2 over the portfolio review cycle t ∈ 0 T . The resource investments lead to revenue streams that accrue to the principal. During the portfolio review cycle, the revenue is R 1 with probability 1 − F t and R 1 + R 2 with probability F t . Therefore, the total expected revenue is
The term within the integrand represents the total expected revenue (from the existing and new product) during the portfolio review cycle, while V 1 + V 2 represents the total expected revenue after the portfolio review cycle.
The agent's efforts also generate information signals x 1 = p 1 + 1 and x 2 = p 2 + 2 , where i ∼ N 0 2 i . The principal offers the agent a wage, w x 1 x 2 = b + a 1
The wage consists of a fixed portion plus an incentive portion that depends on the resources allocated over the portfolio review cycle. We assume that the agent's expected utility takes the form of
where U x = −exp −rx . Note that in addition to her wage, the agent also has career concerns, C 3 Z T , which may be positive or negative depending on her ability to effectively manage resources. Using the exponential utility and the linear wage, we can deduce that the agent's certainty equivalent is
The principal's expected payoff is
, which under the linear wage scheme is simply
p 2 dt . Therefore, the total certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their joint surplus) is
Note that the joint surplus is independent of the fixed wage, b. The fixed wage serves only to split the joint surplus between the principal and the agent. An incentive-efficient linear contract must maximize the total certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their joint surplus) subject to all constraints (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) . Q.E.D.
First-Best Outcome. The first-best outcome occurs when r = 0 or 2 1 = 2 2 = 0 in Equation (3). In that case, the problem facing the principal becomes
subject to the dynamic equations that define P 1 , P 2 , F , and Z. Each NPD funding rule defines a different structure for the problem stated in Equation (7). The first-best is solved using optimal control theory (Kamien and Schwartz 1991, Sethi and Thompson 2000) . Below, we state the Hamiltonian (H ) and salvage value function ( ):
where = B if NPD funding is fixed, = R 1 if NPD funding is variable, 1 t is the marginal value of effort toward improving the existing product, 2 t is the marginal value of effort toward developing the new product, and 3 t is the marginal value of the cumulative net budget. The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality are
2 = − H P 2 and 2 T = P 2 (13)
Equations (10) and (11) are the necessary first-order conditions for the decision variables p 2 and p 2 , respectively. Equations (12), (13), and (14) are the necessary conditions for the marginal value functions for P 1 , P 2 , and Z, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we do not reiterate the state equations, which also form part of the necessary conditions. Lemmas 1 and 2 provide analyses of the necessary conditions, which are useful for our subsequent analysis of the NPD portfolio.
Lemma 1 (Marginal Value Functions). 1 is positive and decreasing in time, 2 is positive and decreasing in time, and
3 is positive and constant in time. Proof of Lemma 1. We integrate backward from T using Equations (12)- (14) to arrive at the following:
It should be clear by inspection that 1 , 2 , and 3 are positive. To understand how they change over time, we can use Liebnitz's rule to differentiate Equations (15)- (17) directly, or we can use the necessary conditions given in Equations (12)- (14). Either way, we have˙ 1 = − R 1 / P 1 1 +
Lemma 2 (Optimal Effort Allocation). (i)
The optimal rate of effort expended on improving the existing product, p 1 , is defined implicitly by C 1 / p 1 = 1 / 1 + 3 for t ∈ 0 T . (ii) The optimal rate of effort expended on developing the new product, p 2 , is defined implicitly by C 2 / p 2 = 2 / 1 + 3 for t ∈ 0 T . Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows directly from Equations (10) and (11):
Note that the necessary conditions capture an intuitive trade-off between marginal cost and marginal benefit: The cost is an instantaneous cost of effort, whereas the benefit is a trade-off between investing resources for product development versus saving those resources in the cumulative net budget. Q.E.D. Proof of Lemma 3. We use the results from Lemmas 1 and 2 to describe the dynamic behavior of p 2 and p 2 . First, note that 3 is constant in time, which implies that 3 will not impact the dynamic behavior of p 2 or p 2 ( 3 may make the decision variables higher or lower, but it will not cause them to increase or decrease in time). The dynamic behavior of p 2 and p 2 will be defined by the dynamic behavior of 1 and 2 , respectively. Because both 1 and 2 decrease in time, so, too, p 2 and p 2 decrease in time. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 (Funding Authority and NPD Portfolio Balance).
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that p 1 under variable funding is greater than p 1 under fixed funding. This translates directly to cost and subsequently lowers the ratio
Using the inverse function we can write
is an increasing function of its argument because C 1 is increasing and convex.
For variable funding, 1 = 
is an increasing function of its argument because C 1 is increasing and convex. If the agent is operating under fixed funding, p 1 / c 3 = f −1 1 / 3 3 / c 3 < 0, wherec 3 = C 3 / Z. If the agent is operating under variable funding, then
The fact that the numerator of (20) may be positive or negative leads to the existence of a threshold time, t c . We can express the numerator of (20) as 1 + 3 T t R 1 / P 1 ds − 1 .
A little algebra leads to the following condition: p 1 / c 3 > 0 if T t R 1 / P 1 ds / C 1 / p 1 > 1. This expression represents a trade-off for Z T in terms of instantaneous cost of effort p 1 versus the ability of that effort to create NPD budget over the remainder of the portfolio review cycle. Assume that the inequality holds for t = 0. Note that for some t c ∈ 0 T , the inequality must be reversed because at t = T the expression T t R 1 / P 1 ds = 0. Proof of the result for p 2 follows exactly the same reasoning as that of Proposition 3. To conserve space we omit the proof. Q.E.D. Proof of Proposition 4. We first provide the intuition behind the proof of Proposition 4. The decision sequence for our principal-agent problem is as follows: The principal offers the agent a wage contract, and then the agent maximizes her net payoff. Knowing this, the principal can solve the agent's problem for any given values of a 1 and a 2 . The principal can then maximize the joint surplus directly. The agent's problem (given a 1 and a 2 ) is to choose p 1 and p 2 that maximize her utility over wage plus career concerns. Given the solution to the agent's problem, the joint surplus is 
The expressions for the optimal choice of incentives follow directly from the first-order conditions d /da 1 = 0 and d /da 2 = 0. Q.E.D.
A.2. Time Lag Between Effort and Revenue
In this section, we provide an extension that considers a time lag between effort and revenue. We will show that our results remain qualitatively unchanged for any time lag. Specifically, we will show that effort is decreasing in time, and p 1 under fixed funding is less than p 1 under variable funding for all possible time lags between effort and revenue. The time lag is directly incorporated into the state equation for each effort as follows:
Whereas P t is the cumulative effort invested through time t, p is the instantaneous effort invested at time < t, and t − ∈ 0 1 represents the portion of effort invested at time that has an impact on revenue at time t. More formally, · is the density function of the distribution of the time lag between effort and revenue (Hartl and Sethi 1984, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000) . Equation (22) states that the change in cumulative effort at time t (and therefore the change in revenue at t) depends on instantaneous effort invested (t − ) periods in the past. In the case of a lagged state equation, the Hamiltonian becomes
and the first-order conditions are
It is instructive to note that the first-order conditions under the lagged state equations are aligned with the original model. To see this, let − t = 1 if − t = 0 and − t = 0 otherwise (this represents the special case of no time lag between effort and revenue). For any positive time lag between effort and revenue, we have the following result: Proof of Claim. From Lemma 1, we know that 1 t is positive and decreasing in time and 1 + 3 is constant in time. Therefore, for any positive lag, we need only consider the numerator of the first-order condition. Let x t = 
Because 1 t is positive and decreasing for t ∈ 0 T and · ∈ 0 1 , it becomes clear that x t is decreasing in time, which implies that p 1 is decreasing in time. Note that the form of 1 t is not altered by the time lag. We know that
